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Ethics of the new economic credentialing:
Conflicted leadership roles
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, and Bruce W. Richman, MA, Houston,
TexFor many years Dr X has been the Chief of Surgical
Services and the only credentialed vascular surgeon at
St Antipathy, a mid-sized, greatly underfunded private
hospital in a small city. He now serves as well on the
hospital’s board of directors. An opportunity has arisen
for him to join several professional friends in founding
a local physician-owned ambulatory surgery center
(ASC). He planned to pursue this project while main-
taining his positions at St Antipathy’s, but when the
hospital administration learned of his plans, the board
of directors asked him and his partners to resign their
hospital staff memberships. This would of course re-
quire surrender of his other hospital positions as well.
He could do outpatient procedures like arteriovenous
fistulas at the ASC but would require continuing access
to inpatient services. The nearest other hospital suit-
ably equipped for major inpatient vascular procedures
is 50 miles away. What should he do?
A. Withdraw from the ambulatory surgery center project.
B. Refuse to resign any of his positions at St Antipathy.
C. Resign from the hospital and accept the associated
inconveniences imposed.
D. Resign from the board of directors but refuse to resign
his medical staff privileges or his position as Chief of
Surgery.
E. Resign as board member and Chief of Surgery but refuse
to leave the medical staff.
Modern medicine is an altruistic business with a com-
plex organizational structure, inviting a tangle of knotty
financial conflicts. As long as the cost-plus payment system
was in effect, these conflicts were considered trivial because
the pool of resources was deep enough to accommodate
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366everyone very nicely. Because every medical doctor, regard-
less of efficiency, turned a handsome profit for the hospital,
conflicts were usually resolved in the physician’s favor. As
third party payers’ business strategies squeezed hospitals
and physicians by raising financial risks, economic conflicts
began to be taken more seriously.
The authorization to practice medicine at a particular
hospital is clearly understood as a privilege, not a right.
Medical staff privileging stresses the physician’s responsibil-
ities and restrictions on their scope of practice. Almost
every hospital’s privileging documents specify the institu-
tion’s authority to rescind hospital access for violations of
the medical staff bylaws. Because physicians are considered
to be the only legitimate judges of their colleagues’ prac-
tices, the institutional responsibility guaranteeing the qual-
ity of care within its domain is assigned to peer review.
Historically, at least in theory, the criteria for appointment
and continuation as a medical staff member have exclusively
been those used for determining whether a physician meets
institutional quality standards in patient care.
The peer review system in credentialing works fairly
well, when it is permitted to. Sometimes occult criteria with
territorial financial undercurrents are permitted to influ-
ence and even determine where some otherwise qualified
physicians practice. Physician’s interests in limiting compe-
tition and hospital executive’s recruitment through eco-
nomic incentives have accompanied the process for some
time, drawing little disdain. Whether that is a good or a bad
thing in the life of a hospital can become a complicated
question. Currently, fostered by concern about the fiscal
well being of their institutions, hospital administrators are
carefully scrutinizing the efficiency of the doctors who
practice there. Nevertheless, the lay administration’s overt
role in deciding which physicians practice in its hospital has
typically been secondary to the process of peer evaluation.
Both the hospital administration and medical leader-
ship are interested in clinical quality and in economics when
they consider their medical staffs. Historically, quality was
exclusively the concern of the medical staff, and finance was
left to the administration. This long-standing tradition
faded when cost-plus reimbursement systems were replaced
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reduce hospital reimbursements. Inefficient medical prac-
tices like redundant laboratory tests and lengthy inpatient
stays were once gold mines for hospitals, but they have
become intolerable liabilities. Quality of care, once mea-
sured only by clinical outcome, began to be evaluated by
financial variables like average hospital or intensive care unit
days, operating room cost, total cost of hospitalization by
diagnosis, or even the time it takes a particular surgeon to
do a procedure. Rightly or wrongly, physicians have been
made to feel unmistakable and ever-increasing pressure
from cost-conscious hospital administrators to reduce ex-
penses by closely monitoring resource utilization. Al-
though re-credentialing decisions are properly reserved to
the medical staff, most administrators quietly believe they
can influence the reappointment of physicians who appear
to lose money for the hospital. Only relatively recently has
the practice of unilaterally revoking physician’s privileges by
hospital boards, termed economic credentialing, become a
regular event.
The physician’s milieu is necessarily a public trust, with
the most restrictive moral obligations on personal-
professional relationships of any human endeavor for which
money is exchanged for service.1 There is a significant
difference between the ethical standards required of a med-
ical professional and those expected of an honest business-
man.2 The virtues, values, goals, and their applications are
distinct; the physician’s interests are voluntarily subordi-
nated to the patient’s best interest. Fundamentally, deci-
sions are made with the consideration of who will benefit
most; fiduciary decisions assure that patients will be the
beneficiaries. Commercial ethics, by contrast, promote the
concept that each party is justified in acting to protect and
advance self-interest.
Medicine nowadays commingles professional and com-
mercial ethics. The activities required in managing an of-
fice, negotiating with third party payers, teaching trainees,
and interacting with hospital administrations reflect both
value systems, but the physician’s primary responsibility is
always to care for the sick, the injured, and the helpless.
How should a conscientious physician determine which
element of a given relationship should be governed by a
professional medical ethic that sublimates self-interest, and
which by the business ethic that places primary value on
self-interest? Physicians do not have the same fiduciary
obligations toward their office landlords, their hospital
administrators, or their investment companies that they
have toward their patients. Also these non-patients do not
owe the same respect and deference to physicians during
business dealings.
The test to be applied is straightforward. The profes-
sional fiduciary role applies to all decisions that affect pa-
tient care of the medical “community” served, directly or
indirectly. The ethical constructs of business apply to
wholly financial decisions that do not affect the quality of
patient care. As used herein, the word quality is understood
in the clinical outcomes context of patient therapy rather
than cost of outcome. Although modern doublespeak hasconjoined cost and quality, and they often parallel each
other, they are not identical. The cheapest therapy of a
particular disease is for the patient to die early on.
Is our well-established, successful surgeon, serving in
multiple leadership roles at St Antipathy, within his rights
to form new business allegiances without reproach? Will his
division of loyalties affect patient care? Ownership of a
competing medical facility clearly conflicts with the leader-
ship positions this surgeon holds at Antipathy. His seat on
the board of directors is especially conflicted. The posi-
tion’s conferral of extraordinary influence on institutional
decisions and special access to its most sensitive information
is based on a trust that he will never favor a competitor, an
assurance he can no longer make. This eliminates option B
as an ethical response. Likewise, the position of Chief of
Surgery reflects a trust endowed with substantial influence
over the practices of the institution’s largest profit centers.
His duty to honor the integrity of the position with undi-
vided loyalty eliminates the propriety of option D.
The struggle between the surgeon’s right to retain
medical staff privileges on the basis of his sound practice
and compliance with medical staff rules and the hospital’s
right to decredential a practitioner solely on the basis of
commercial competition is ethically more indistinct, there-
fore more complex and very context dependent. If our
surgeon resigns his leadership positions and becomes a
member of the general medical staff, he will no longer
exercise special influence, receive privileged information, or
affect hospital business policies. He will control his own
practice by deciding where patients will have their opera-
tions. Selection of sites will be determined less by financial
than by resource requirements, with the nature of the
vascular procedure effectively dictating whether it is to be
done on an inpatient or an outpatient basis. Lost revenue
from the highly profitable outpatient surgery business
might nevertheless seriously affect St Antipathy’s ability to
continue providing the community with some loss leader
services like geriatrics, burn unit, or the emergency center.
Option E appears initially attractive, because it elimi-
nates the ethical dilemmas associated with retaining the
leadership roles in the hospital. This option remains prob-
lematic, however, when we consider the fiduciary obliga-
tion to patients and the community at large the surgeon
shares with the hospital.3 As a hospital staff member, the
physician is entitled to expect his hospital to conduct its
business to the benefit of its patients. The physician must
join the hospital in recognizing co-fiduciary obligations not
only to his own patients but also to the entire patient
population served by St Antipathy’s. Our surgeon’s transfer
of his patients—and the transfers of his colleagues and
co-owners—to his proposed outpatient program would
threaten the legitimate economic self-interest of St Antip-
athy. Indeed, its financial stability could be undermined,
denying it resources that it needs to serve all of its patients
and perhaps even threatening the hospital’s survival as an
essential community resource. The surgeon’s primary mo-
tivation in planning to invest in the surgery center is not
fulfillment of fiduciary responsibility to his patients—he’s
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interest. Among those privileged to be physicians, financial
self-interest should always be secondary to more ethically
demanding patient responsibilities. Option E thus lacks
ethical justification.
Option C does not violate the fiduciary obligation the
surgeon shares with the hospital because it eliminates the
hospital role that incurs this joint responsibility. By resign-
ing all his hospital affiliations, however, our surgeon will
jeopardize any patients who need emergency inpatient
vascular surgery or emergency transfer to the hospital from
the ASC.
Option A is the ethically justified alternative. By plan-
ning to invest in the surgery center to advance his self-
interest at substantial risk to the hospital, our surgeon
would deserve the imprecations of medical ethics but in-
stead should subjugate his own interests to the needs of
people whom he has accepted an obligation to serve. These
sacrifices are routinely made by ethical physicians.
Assertions of individual autonomy and protection of
economic self-interest should not be the fundamental re-
sponses of physicians to hospital restrictions and cost con-
trols. Assumption of shared fiduciary responsibility, in the
absence of which professional autonomy is stripped of itsship accept the principles of professional co-fiduciary re-
sponsibility confirms the physician’s equivalent obligations.
The building of a competitive surgical facility in a small
market would harm St Antipathy’s patient population and
should be abandoned.
Although this hypothetical construct is intended to
illustrate the physician’s institutional co-fiduciary responsi-
bility and the need to consider the consequences of entre-
preneurial activities on the community, other types of
hospital infringements on the privileging process might be
entirely unacceptable and will be discussed in a later article.
In this case, however, the hospital’s apparent harsh re-
sponse to the threat of economic competition is in fact a
legitimate defense of its clinical care programs.
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